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CHAPTER 1
IlfTROpUCTION
In traditional learning and problem-solving studies, there Is
typically an element of homogeneity in the experimental work; S'a
task is soluble, and his errors are corrected. Clearly this is not
the case in many "real world" learning situations. Kan is not always
presented with immediate, complete, and accurate information concerning
the appropriateness of his actions. Instead, he is perenially "fore-
casting" the probable results of his behavior, or that of others, and
many of his responses must be learned with inconsistent consequences,
and Intermittent rewards. Much of his feedback is defective in one
form or another. Three primary experimental paradigms have been used
to study this kind of learning, all falling under the general clas-
sification of probability learning .
Three Models of Probability Learning
Occurrence prediction . Many experimenters have asked S to predict
the occurrence of an event, for example, the illumination of one of
two small lights, with absolutely no physical attributes or other
cues available to use as aids in prediction. The independent variable
in this model is the proportion of the two events in an otherwise random
sequence of events.
Mislnformative feedback. A frequently used paradigm is one in
which the optimal response is made by S, but is followed by consequences
indicating an error, or a nonoptimal response is followed by information
2signaling correct action. The S is thus misinformed about the correct-
ness of his response, or, in other words, receives misinformative feed-
back (MP). In this case, of course, there are stimulus cues with which
to make judgements, and often more independent variables than the pro-
portion of MP.
Honcontinaent feedback . This form of experiment, in its complete
sense, has received little attention. It requires that the reinforce-
ment be totally unrelated to the actions or predictive constructs of S.
Reward simply occurs in a random, or perhaps fixed ratio manner. Spurious
cues are presented to S, and proportion of noncontingent reinforcement
is the major independent variable.
rch With Occurrence Prediction
The earliest of the occurrence prediction studies was that of
(1939), who used a technique of verbal expectations regarding
the occurrences of the second of two successive stimuli, i.e., lights
on a panel. His first group was given 25 trials with the left light
always following the right, and rose rapidly toward 100 per cent posi-
tive expectation. The second group, given 50 per cent (random)
occurrences of the left following the right light, continued to vary
around 50 per cent affirmative predictions.
Grant, Hake, and Hornseth (1951) improved upon this experiment
by including reinforcement percentages of 25 per cent, and 75 per cent.
At the end of the training series, each of the four groups was found
to be responding in a proportion roughly equivalent to the percentage
of reinforced trials. This behavior has subsequently been called
probability matching (e.g., Estes, 1964). The Se in the 25 end 75
per cent groups could have, but did not maximize their probabilities
of correct prediction by responding in sccord with the sore likely
alternative 100 per cent of the time. Other expectancy studies,
using various proportions of reinforcement, but vith similar results,
have been performed by Estee and Straughan (1954) ; Friedman, Burke,
Cole, Keller, Millward and Eates (1964); Greeno (1962); end Messlck
and Solley (1957).
Research With Misinformative Feedback
It is noteworthy that both Humphreys end Grant used cueless situ-
ations. If instead, S is flooded with cues, does probability matching
still occur? To investigate this question, it is necessary to turn
to MP. By replacing the signal lights of the cueless situation with
more complex stimuli in which relevant attributes are releted to rein-
forcement on some percentage basis, an MP situation la created.
Goodnow and Postman (1955), using geometrical designs in a two-
choice problem-solving context, included MP percentages of 0, 10, 20,
30, 40, and 50. The Ss responded with probability matching behavior
even though they did not realise that the task was a probability situ
etion, and were trying to find lawful solutions to the problem. Morin
(1955), in e rather similar experimental situation, found maximising
behavior in groups prewarned of MP, but a lack of probability matching
in the unwarned groups. Morin, however, did not elaborate on this
striking finding. Pishkln (1960), used en MP design with 0, 10, 20,
30, and 40 per cent MP, with problem complexities of 1, 3, and 5
4Irrelevant dimensions. He found Chat asymptotic mean error scores
did not differ significantly from mean values predicted by a probability-
matching hypothesis. This was true over all complexity groups, and in
the 10, 20, and 30 per cent MP groups. Pishkln'a study has been
replicated and extended by Johannsen (1962), who used 0, 12.5, 25,
and 37.5 per cent MP with 1, 3, and 6 irrelevant dimensions.
Research With Noncontingent Peedback
A noncontingent (NC) feedback study attempts to determine what
amount of the process of developing and testing hypotheses is purely
a function to the occurrence of reward, without confounding this with
the specific stimulus or response aspects of the situation preceding
reinforcement. This may be accomplished by use of a predetermined
reinforcement schedule which is unrelated to any stimulus attribute,
or any specific verbal or motor response of S.
Jenkins (1959) made use of a mathematical concept formation task
with NC positive reinforcement in percentages ranging from 33 1/3
to 100. His §8 offered extremely complex hypotheses even though
they were told that it might be impossible to solve the problems*
There waa a tendency toward less complexity with high NC positive
feedback, although this did not reach significance. New hypotheses
were introduced at the greatest rate early in learning. It was also
noticed that a variety of hypotheses were introduced by S, and held
simultaneously, though he might have received no errors.
Wright (1962) extended this research by using 16 possible responses,
325 trials, and 0, 20, 50, 80, and 100 per cent NC positive feedback.
His results indicated that hypothesis complexity is greatest at SO per
cent, and that probability of response repetition was a linear function
of proportion of KC positive feedback. Although the response levels
were below what would be expected in probability matching behavior,
this may have resulted from the 16, as opposed to the usual 2 possible
re%poase». Generally Ss do not detect that feedback is noncontingent.
There is recent evidence (Jenkins and Ward, 1965), that it is very
difficult, if not impossible, for them to do so.
Thus the general finding is that under conditions of random HC
reinforcement, Ss respond in an orderly, systematic fashion, although
their hypotheses vary greatly both within and between Ss. One is re-
minded of Skinner's (1948) development of "superstition" in pigeons by
using fixed interval reinforcement schedules, and of similar results
found by Guthrie (1946), in examining the behavior of cats in puzsle-
boxes. It is probable that the reinforcement of unrequired responses,
on nonrequisite particulars of a response occurs frequently in learn-
ing experiments, and certainly even more often in real- life situations*
Contentions Regarding Probability Matching
Exactly why probability matching occurs remains unclear. Bruner,
Goodnow, and Austin (1956) submit that it is probably the result of a
combination of three factors: (s) the hope of a unique solution, (b)
interest in the less probable alternative, and (c) the need for a direct
test of a hypothesis. There is some experimental support for this
position (e.g., Goodnow, 1955a, 1955b; Morin, 1955; Hyman and Jenkin,
1956), but none of it explains why the response levels should arrive at
6probability matching, rather than some other level, excluding 100 per cent.
It is Bourne's contention (1963) that probability matching represents
only e transitory level of performance. Thus his Ss were run for a total
of 1200 trials, by the end of which nearly all Ss adopted the maximising,
100 per cent response behavior. It could, however, be ergued that after
such a protracted period of feilure, Ss simply "gave up" and no longer
attempted to solve the problem.
Goodnow and Pettigrew (1955) suggest that a "win- stay, loae-
shift" stretegy must inevitably result in probability matching. Hake
and Hyman (1953) point out that probability matching may result from
following a sequential rule baaed upon the occurrences of prior events.
Estes (1964) warns that apparent probability matching in some cases
may be the result of a methodological artifact in grouped data, with
some Ss rising rapidly toward 100 per cent, and others varying around
50 per cent response levels. Along with specific strategies, "subjects
are using the overall relative frequency of the two events es a general
guide" according to Bruner, et al. (1956, p. 188). To what extent Ss are
aware of the actual percentages, however, is not clear from the liter-
ature.
yjoral Characteristics of Problem Solving; Mathematical Modela
Recently there have been several attempts to construct mathematical
models to describe error and trials data in concept -formation situations.
These models have enjoyed fair success in describing behavior in such
instances. Both stimulus sampling theory," aa outlined by Atkinson,
Bower, and Crothera (1965), and Restle's "hypothesis sampling theory"
(1961), make two basic assumptions regarding Ss* behavior. First, if
7the response to a hypothesis sampled on trial n was correct, the seas
hypothesis will be maintained on trial nfl. Second, If the response
is erroneous, S randomly chooses from the pool of possible hypotheses
(resampling with replacement), and obtains a new hypothesis for trial
n+-l. Some experimental support for these assumptions is provided by
Bourne (1965), end Levine (1966). These mathematical models are de-
signed primarily for problems which have some strategies yielding 100
per cent correct feedback. If, however, S believes that he may com-
pletely solve the problem by some means, the behavioral assumptions
should not differ in the probability -learning task.
Thus one is led to two clear predictions. First, sfter a correct
response S will maintain the hypothesis which provided him with this
success, but after an error, § will either change his hypothesis com-
pletely or modify it to some extent. Second, if S chooses s new
hypothesis, it must be expected that some measurable amount of time
is required for him to do so, and that this time will be added to the
temporal delay typical in choice behavior. That is, response latency
after an error should exceed that after a correct response. Such an
effect has been found by Srickson, Zajkowski, and Ehmann (196S) in a
standard concept formation task, but has not been examined in a
probability learning situation.
Plan of the Present Study
From the above review of the history, theoretical stances, sod
general commentary upon probability matching and behavioral charac-
teristics of problem- solving, numerous questions arise. The goal of
8Che present etudy is to critically examine but a few of then, by the
use of three related experiments, end comparisons among them when ap-
plicable. Collection of error data, supplemented by recordings of Ss
1
verbalised hypotheses In these three experimental psradigms are used to
explore the origin and generality of probability matching behavior.
The hypothesis data are coupled with measurements of response latencies
in order to investigate conceptual behavioral characteristics of problem-
solving, particularly the assumptions of the mathematical models. Obser-
vations are made pertaining to the course of probability learning in
the three models in order to determine how it may differ as a result of
Che particular qualities of each situation.
Experiment 1 is a standard MT situation except that the number
of irrelevant dimensions is limited only by S's imagination. Experi-
ment 2 is a truly noncontlngent paradigm; no matter what hypothesis
is used by S, or what response he gives, his feedback of "right"
or "wrong" is predetermined. Experiment 3 is a standard occurrence-
prediction study, not unlike that of Humphreys. The Ss in all three
experiments are told that the problem Is soluble. It does not appear
that these three Important models for the study of probability learning
have ever before been compared In the same,study.
CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
MISINFORMATiVE FEEDBACK
Wthod
Subjects and Design . Forty student volunteers from Introductory
psychology classes participated as Ss and were assigned in order of
appearance to one of four treatments. Two Ss were dropped because of
what appeared to be an antagonistic attitude toward the task, and
were subsequently replaced. The experimental design was a 4 x 8
repeated measures factorial design, including four levels of MP (0,
10, 20, and 30 per cent), and eight successive 10-trial blocks.
Materials and Apparatus . The stimuli consisted of three-digit
numbers, 39 of which ended with an even digit, and 41 of which ended
with an odd digit, unsystematically distributed over the 80 trials.
These stimuli were placed on projector slides, and Ss responded by
pressing buttons on a control panel labeled "X" and "Hot X." In ad-
dition to the control panel, the apparatus consisted of five major
components: (a) a Kodak Carousel slide projector used to present
the series of stimuli (b) , a 7 x 8- in. translucent screen placed
directly in front of S on which the stimuli were rear-projected,
(c) an Esterline-Angus operations recorder used to record the correct
answer, S's response, and the response latency, (d) three Hunter
timers used to control delay and duration of feedback and post-
feedback interval, and (3) a Western Union tape transmitter, used
10
to control S's signal lamps. Delay of feedback was 0.5 sec, duration
of feedback was 2.0 sec., and post-feedback interval was 2.3 sec.
During each trial the following sequence of events took place.
When S pressed one of the response buttons, the response was recorded
by the Ester line Angus recorder, and the timing unit was activated.
The timing unit advanced the Western Union tape transmitter, which
both illuminated the correct signal lamp, and recorded the correct
response, 0.5 sec. after S's response. After 2 more seconds, the
timing unit again activated the transmitter, turning off the signal
lamp. After another 2.3 sec, the projector advanced, and projected
the next stimulus upon the screen. The Ester line-Angus recorder
operated continuously throughout each S's session.
Several constraints were imposed on the sequence of stimuli
in addition to approximately one half of them being even, and one half
odd. The randomly selected numbers were corrected so that all digits
appeared approximately equally often In all positions (first, second,
and third digit spaces) , excepting zero which was confined to the
second and third digit spaces. The stimuli were arranged so that ap-
proximately one half of the Type X's fell in the first 40 trials, and
the remainder in the second 40 trials. Runs of the same category
(X or Hot-X) were limited to a fh— of six successive stimuli
(See Appendix 1).
Task and Procedure
. The task was similar to a standard concept-
formation task in that S was required to learn to classify a series
of visually presented stimuli into categories labeled X and Not-X.
11
The problem was unlike most concept- formation problems in that the
number of dimensions available to S was extremely large, even though
only one was relevant. Thus it was possible for S to hypothesise the
relevant dimension as being numbers above or below 500, the highest
or lowest number in a certain position, some arithmetical manipulation,
and so on, before finding the optimal solution, i.e., that numbers end-
ing with an even digit (0,2,4,6,8) were Type X. The categories of X
and Hot-X were chosen in order to avoid S's development of two concepta,
as might have occurred with categories such as X and T.
At the beginning of the experiment, each S was given oral in-
structiona, which were the same for all four groups. These instructions
are given in Appendix 2. Two examples were given of the type of
stimuli to be presented. The Ss were told to look for a rule which
would allow them to solve the problem. Ho hint of the possibility
of Iff, or of the type of rule which was necessary was given. The Ss
were also instructed that they would be periodically interrupted in
their task to be questioned about the strategy, or decision rule which
they were using at the time. The stimuli were rear-projected, one
at a time, on the screen before S.
To categorise a number, S responded by pressing either the X
button on the Mot-X button on the control panel below the screen.
The correct answer was then indicated by the illumination of a green
Jewel lamp above the proper button. All problems wero self-paced,
| being allowed as much time as needed to make any re^onse. Bach
S had 80 trials, whether or not he found the optimal solution to
12
the problem. After every five trials S was asked to pause and tell B
what kind of a decision rule he was applying. His response was re-
corded by E on a scoring sheet, but no clues were given by S as
to the appropriateness of S's approach. At the end of 80 trials,
S was asked for an estimate of what per cent of the atioBili had been
Type X. The S was then told that the experiment was concluded, the
answer to the problem, and the 10, 20, and 30 per cent MP groups
of the existence of MP.
Results
Error Data . Here we are concerned with "true," or absolute
scoring pertaining to the correct hypothesis, as opposed to error
and correct feedback indicated to S. Absolute and indicated errors
:imes differed because of the presence of MP. Table 1 shows
the summary of analysis of variance of absolute errors. Proportion
of MP was significantly related to the number of errors; the more
MP, the greater the proportion of absolute errors. Significance of the
10-trial Blocks effect demonstrated learning over the 80 trials. The
P x B interaction, also significant, expresses the divergence of the
four groups from slightly better than chance responding to their final
levels. A performance level indicative of probability matching was
not in evidence here (See Pig. 1). However, analysis of variance of
the last block of 10 trials showed the P effect to be significant be-
yond the .01 level (Table 2), and the four groups were ordered in accord
with their respective levels of MP.
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Table 1
Analysis of Variance Suawry Table for Absolute Errors
in Experiment I (cue-contingent situation)
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
Proportion MF (P) 3 82.64 10.57***
Ss/P 36 7.82
10-Trial Blocks (B) 7 32.11 12.49***
P x B 21 4.13 1.61*
Ss/P x 1 252 2.57
Total 319
Table 2
Analysis of Variance Suanary Table for Absolute Errors
in the Last Block of Ten Trials of Experiment I
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
Proportion MP (P) 3 28.03 8.87***
Ss/P 36 3.16
Total 39
Significant beyond the .05 level.
***Significant beyond the .001 level.
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Latency Data , The summary of analysis of variance of latencies
across 80 trials is shown in Table 3. Each S was given four scores:
aean latency after an indicated error, and mean latency after an indi-
cated correct response, for the first and the second 40 trials. These
scores were used in the analysis. Proportion of HP did not significantly
affect response latency. The after-error, after-correct (E) effect,
on the other hand, shows that S tended to respond more slowly after
an error than after a correct response (Means: 7.83 sec, and 6.51 sec).
Average latency did not change from the first 40 trials to the latter
40, but was remarkably stable, as shown by the low mean square of the
Blocks effect. None of the interactions was significant. Analysis
of variance of the first 40 trials only (Table 4) was done to include
the sero percent MP group, which had been excluded from the first
analysis since many of these Ss made no errors in the last 40 trials.
Much the same results were found, the only significant effect being
longer response latency following an indicate error (Means: 7.88 sec,
and 6.45 sec).
Hypothesis Data . As mentioned above, Ss were requested to verbally
state their strategies after every fifth trial. This material was
analysed in terms of (a) major changes of hypotheses, (b) minor
amendments of an earlier hypothesis, and (c) changes and amendments
combined for total alterations of hypotheses. Tables 5, 6, and 7 sum-
marise these analyses. In none of them was proportion MF a significant
variable. The Trials effect was significant with regard to hypothesis
changes and total alterations, showing a decline as Ss approached
problem "solution." The first block (Trial 5) was omitted from analysis
Table 3
16
Analysis of Variance
in Experiment
> Summary Table for Response Latencies
I (cue contingent situation)
Source df Mean Square P Ratio
Proportion MP (P) 2 260084.7 1.04
Ss/P 27 249772.3
After Error, or Correct (E) 1 530270.4 11.15**
Blocks of 40 Trials (B) 1 9.2
P x E 2 13914.6
III 2 100833.7 2.12
E x B 1 3091.4
P x E x B 2 27622.6
Residual 81 47542.3
Total 119
Table 4
Analysis of Vsriance Sum
in the Pirst Block of
lary Table for Response Latencies
Porty Trials in Experiment I
Source df Mean Square P Ratio
Proportion MP (P) 3 39298.
Ss/P 36 86924.
Afi vs. AC (E) 1 604476. 30.86***
P X E 3 20334. 1.04
Residual 36 19586.
Total 79
^^Significant beyond the .01 level.
***Significant beyond the .001 level.
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Major
Changes by Subjects in Experiment 1
Hypothesis
Source df Mean Square P Ratio
Proportion MP (P) 2 0.725
Ss/P 27 1.359
Trials (T) 14 1.266 10.639***
P x T 28 .077
Ss x T (residual) 378 .119
Total 449
Table 6
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Minor
Amendments by Subjects in Experiment
Hypothesis
I
Source df Mean Square P Ratio
Proportion MP (P) 2 0.800 1.347
Ss/P 27 0.594
Trials (T) 14 0.260 1.405
P x T 28 0.193 1.043
Ss x T (residual) 378 0.185
Total 449
***Significant beyond the .001 level.
18
Analysis of Variance &
(changes and
Table 7
ry Table for Total Alterations of Hypotheses
s combined) in Experiment I
Source df Mean Square P Ratio
Proportion (P) 2 0.950 1.316
Ss/P 27 0.722
Trials CD 14 1.121 7.232***
P x T 28 0.165 1.065
Ss x T (residual) 378 0.155
Total 449
*
Significant beyond the .001 level.
since at this point allSs stated a new (first) hypothesis. The 5
trial blocks effect was not significant with respect to hypothesis
amendments, Che number of which remained relatively constant throughout
the series. These effects are shown in Fig. 2. This graph may be
read inversely, as perseveration, or retention of hypotheses , which
may or may not have been optimal ones.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
KMCONTINGENT FEEDBACK
Wthod
Subjects and Design . The Ss were 30 student volunteers fro*
introductory psychology classes, and as before, were assigned to
groups in order of appearance. Two Ss were dropped from the exper-
iment because of an apparently negative attitude toward the task,
and were replaced. The experimental design was a 3 x 8 repeated
measures factorial design. In this experiment the feedback was non-
contingent with regard to the stimuli, and S's responses. No matter
what S did, he was told that he was wrong a certain percentage of the
time. The indicated errors occurred at the same points as did MP
in Experiment 1. The three groups differed in that they consisted
of 10, 20, or 30 per cent error feedback. Zero per cent error feed-
back was not uaed since it was presumed that S would soon become
suspicious. There was no true or optimal answer to the problem, but
any strategy S chose was as good as any other.
notarials and Apparatus . The stimuli, number of trials, and
sequence of events were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. Ap-
paratus was identical with the exception of the control panel, which
had to be adapted for noncontingent feedback. The same two response
buttons, labeled in the same way, were present, but in the vertical
plane between them were mounted (at the top) a green lamp labeled
"right,
'
and (at the bottom) a red lamp labeled "wrong."
21
Task and Procedure . The task, as S understood it, was exactly
the same as in Experiment 1. The S was to categorize the three-digit
stimuli as X or Not-X. Instruction and procedure were also identical
to those used in Experiment 1.
Results
Error Data . Collection of data based on absolute errors, as in
Experiment 1, was clearly impossible in this case. Since reinforce-
ment was distributed unsystematically throughout the 80 trials, and
any strategy was as good as any other, only indicated, as opposed to
absolute errors, could occur.
Latency Data . Tables 8 and 9 show results similar to those found
in Experiment 1. The only significant main effect was that of E ;
latencies following errors tended to be longer than those following
correct responses: means for the 80 trials were 7.85 sec, and
6.17 sec., while means for the first 40 trials only were 7.75 sec.,
and 6.12 sec, respectively. Again, the P and B variables, as well
as all interactions, were not significant.
Hypothesis Data . Analysis of variance of hypothesis changes,
amendments, and total alterations (See Tables 10, 11, and 12) may be
summarised in much the same way as in Experiment 1. Major changes,
and total alterations decreased significantly over trials, while
amendments continued to fluctuate. All other effects were not sig-
nificant (See Fig. 3). However, this experimental paradigm afforded
the opportunity to examine hypothesis behavior more carefully than in
Experiment 1.
22
Table 8
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Response Latencies
in Experiment 2 (cue-noncontingent situation)
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
Proportion Error (P) 2 676270.2 1.573
Ss/P 27 430012.4
After Error* or Correct (E) 1 844201.8 14.814***
Blocks of 40 Trials (B) 1 6063.4
P x E 2 56492.2
P x B 2 146659.5 2.574
E x B 1 735.1
P x E x B 2 65624.4 1.152
Residual 81 56986.4
Total 119
Table 9
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Response Latencies
in the First Block of Forty Trials in Experiment 2
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
Proportion Error (P) 2 156158.15
Ss/P 27 169841.97
After Error, or Correct (E) 1 397557.60 13.25**
P X E 2 19232.55
Residual 27 30011.23
Total 59
^Significant beyond the .01 level.
***Signifleant beyond the .001 level.
Table 10
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Analysis of Variance Summary
Changes by Subjects
Table for Major Hypothesis
l
in Experiment 2
Source df Mean Square P Ratio
Proportion Error (P) 2 .260
Ss/P 27 .406
Trials (T) 14 .852 11.833***
P x T 28 .055
Ss x T (residual) 378 .072
Total 449
Table 11
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Minor Hypothesis
Amendments by Subjects in Experiment 2
Source df Mean Square P latio
Proportion Error (P) 2 .445 1.165
Ss/P 27 .382
Trials (T) 14 • 286 1.382
P x T 28 .233 1.126
Ss x T (residual) 378 .207
Total 449
***Significant beyond the .001 level •
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Table 12
Analysis of Variance Swsaary Table for Total Alterations of Hypotheses
combined) in Experiment 2
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
—
—
-=
Proportion Error (P) 2 1.285 2.156
8s/P 27 .596
Trials (I) 14 .481 2.237**
P x T 28 .196
Si x T (residual) 378 .215
Total 449
Significant beyond the .01 level.
1. Failure to conform to verbalised hypotheses . In the
groups with 10 and 20 per cent error feedback there was a total of
eleven blocks of five errorless trials, the same for all Ss within
groups. Thus there were 550 points to check whether S, in the absence
of an error, always followed his verbalised hypothesis. In fact, in
105 cases (19.09 per cent) Ss did not conform to their hypotheses.
This, qualitatively, is not a unique finding (e.g., Suppes and Schlag-
Rey, 1965), although its quantification may be of value. However, such
a measurement may also be considered an indicant of how well Ss verbalised
their hypotheses.
2. Spontaneous hypothesis alteration. The same eleven
blocks of five errorless trials allowed an examination of hypothesis
changes and amendments not precipitated by an error. With ten Ss in
each group, there were 110 opportunities to test the assumption that
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no such changes will occur. Upon inspection the date revealed eleven
major changes of hypotheses (10 per cent), and 37 amendments to the
prior hypothesis (33.6 per cent), for a total of 48 alterations of
hypotheses (43.6 per cent), without errors in the preceding block
of five trials*
3. Hypothesis perseveration. In the noncont ingent data
there were 34 blockscontaining at least one indicated error. It
follows that there was a total of 340 inquiry points available to
check hypothesis perseveration following an error. In 178 cases
(52.35 per cent), S did not change or amend his hypothesis, but
maintained the decision rule he had verbalised during the previous
inquiry.
CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 3
OCCURRENCE PREDICTION
Method
Subject* and Design . Again, 30 introductory psychology students
were assigned to groups in order of appearance, and the experimental
design was a 3 x 8 repeated measures factorial design. In this ex
periment the program tapes from Experiment 2 were used with the con-
trol panel of Experiment 1 in such a manner that Type Mot-X was the
correct answer on 10, 20, or 30 per cent of the 80 trials, and occurred
at the same points as did MF in Experiment 1, and noncontingent errors
in Experiment 2.
Materials and Apparatus . The apparatus and sequence of events
were the same as in Experiment 1, with one exception. Instead of the
presentation of three digit stimuli, the screen was blacked out,
and a red jewel lamp placed in its center. The only function of the
lamp was to tell S when he could respond.
Task and Procedure . In contrast to the plethora of dimensions
available to S for his categorisation rules in Experiments 1 and 2,
here there were essentially none. On each trial S was required to
push a button to predict the occurrence of either an X or a Not-X
event. All Ss were provided with the same instructions (See Appendix
2), which explained that their task was to learn to predict whether
each trial (event) would be an X or a Not X, and that the correct
answer would be shown on the control panel after their response. Again,
they were told that there would be a periodic inquiry regard their hypo-
theses. Absolutely no hints were given as to the type of hypothesis they
were to use, or that the series was unsystematic. All other procedures
were identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2.
^MMIts
Error Data. The summary of analysis of variance of absolute
errors is presented in Table 13. Here an absolute error is a Not X
response. Proportion of Not-X was seen to be a significant source
of variance, inversely related to the proportion of correct responses.
These data are graphed in Fig. 4. Improvement of performance under
all Not-X proportions was reflected by the significant Blocks effect.
The significant P x B interaction showed that the divergence of the
three curves over 80 trials was also significant. The final proportions
of correct responses approximated probability matching behavior.
Latency Pata . As might be expected from the results of Experi-
ments 1 and 2, Proportion had no effect (See Table 14). Response
latency was significantly longer following an indicated error than
an indicated correct response (Means: 4.44 sec, and 3.76 sec.).
The Blocks effect was also significant, with a slightly longer average
latency in the second 40 trials (Means: 3.96 sec., and 4.25 sec).
The significant P x E interaction (See Fig. 5) was an unusual one.
It would appear that after a correct response, latency dropped in
direct proportion to the amount of Not-X events. Latencies after
errors, however, were lowest at 20 per cent and almost equally high
29
Table 13
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Absolute Errors
In Experiment 3 (cueless situation)
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
Proportion Not-X (P) 2 108.71 17.94***
Sa/P 27 6.06
Ten-Trial Blocks (B) 7 26.86 13.92***
P x B 14 5.57 2.886**
Sa/P x B 189 1.93
Total 239
Table 14
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Response Latencies
in Experiment 3 (cueless situation)
Source df Mean Square P Ratio
Proportion Hot-X (P) 2 34458.3 1.324
Ss/P 27 26032.1
After Error or Correct (E) 1 137905.2 24.856***
Blocks of 40 Trials (B) 1 25872.0 4.663*
P x E 2 30048.4 5.416**
P x B 2 5270.8
E x B 1 36192.2 6.523*
P x E x B 2 5397.8
Residual 81 5548.1
Total 119
*Signifleant beyond the .05 level.
Significant beyond the .01 lvel.
Significant beyond the .001 level.
30
133HH 03 1130 H3d
o
ITS
O
CO
C3 C3
£3
C3
«(C
C3
C3 C3 cs O
as
U4 P C? CM """*
A.
1 [
1 ! |
1
e e O C3 COCO in «* CO CM o
I
4J
o
Z
4J
c
0)
o
u
a
03
i-l
CO
i-l
MU
u
§
>
o
Vj CO
o
^ a
a) x
w
<u
•U «
3
o c
to «o
£> >
60
H01IH3 1N33 Hid
5.0
31
4.5
S2 4.0
SB
G3
C3
3.5
10 20
PER CEUT NOT - X
Fig. 5. The interaction of per cent Not-X events and the
after-error, after-correct latency effect, Exp. 3.
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at 30 and 10 per cant Not-X event proportions. Such results tend to
suggest the operation of more than one factor controlling response la-
tency. The E x B interaction (Fig. 6) indicated that latency after
correct responses dropped over trials, while latency after an indi-
cated error Increased as the problem went on. Analysis of the first
40 trials only (Table 13) revealed similar effects, with E and P x E
significant for the same reasons.
Hypothesis Data . Since Ss under these conditions changed their
strategy at almost every inquiry point, hypotheses could not be
analysed by the same methods as in Experiments 1 and 2. All Ss,
without exception, attempted to use sequential rules based on the
series of events observed by them prior to inquiry.
Table 15
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Response Latencies
in The First Block of Forty Trials in Experiment 3
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
Proportion Not-X (P) 2 7380.2
Ss/P 27 9587 .5
After Error or Correct (E) 1 16401.0 12.50**
P x E 2 5123.5 3.904*
Residual 27 1312.4
Total 59
*Signlfleant beyond the .05 level.
Significant beyond the .01 level.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTS 1, 2, AND 3
COMBINED ANALYSES
Validity
Experiments 1 and 2 were run concurrently, with Ss assigned
alternately to the two experiments. Thus it is reasonable and
entirely valid to perform combined analyses on these experiments.
Experiment 3 was run later, and hence the interpretation of com-
bined analyses must be tempered by the consideration that there
may have been differences in the S population. Such differences,
if Indeed any exist, are considered minor.
Results
Error Data . It is appropriate that absolute error rates be
compared between Experiments 1 and 3. Table 16 shows that with the
two experiments combined in a single analysis of variance, Groups
(cue ys non-cue), 10- trial Blocks, and the G x B interaction were
all significant sources of variance. These effects are shown in
Fig. 7. After the first block of 10 trials the cue group (Experiment
1) remained worse than the cueless group (Experiment 3) in number of
absolute errors. Both groups' performances showed improvement, but
the cueless group improved at a greater rate. Proportion (MP or
Not-X) also had a significant effect, being related to total number
of absolute errors (Means: 33.6, 28.0, and 19.7). The three-way
interaction of G x P x B is somewhat difficult to interpret, but
35
Table 16
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Absolute Errors Based
on Experiments 1 and 3 Combined (cue and cueless)
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
Groups I and III (G) 1 87.55 12.168**
Proportion MP and Not X (P) 2 122.28 16.995***
G x P 2 13.64 1.896
Ss/G x P 54 7.195
Ten-Trial Blocks (B) 7 37.23 15.951***
G x B 7 5.51 2.361*
P x B 14 2.68 1.148
G x P x B 14 5.31 2.275**
Residual 378 2.334
Total 479
Significant beyond the .05 level.
Significant beyond the .01 level.
Significant beyond the .001 level.
appears to Indicate an increasing divergence of the six curves over the
80 trials beyond that explainable by the P effect alone.
Latency Data . Response latencies were the only behavioral Measure
applicable to comparison of all three experimental groups. Table 17
presents the summery of analysis of variance for their combined data.
Once again, Proportion (MP, NC errors, Not-X events) did not prove to
have a significant effect upon response latency. The significant Groups
effect seemed to result mainly from the rapid responses of Ss in
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Table 17
Analysis of Variance Siasoary Table for Response Latencies
in Experiments 1, 2, 3 Combined
Source df Mean Square P Ratio
Proportion (F)
(MP, Not X, Error)
2 190840.
Groups I, II, III (G) 2 5515315. 23.440***
P x G 4 389365. 1.654
St/ f x G 81 235287.
After Error or Correct (E) 1 1353014. 36.872***
Block of 40 Trials (B) 1 20071.
P x E 2 103.
P x B 2 145237. 3.958*
E x B 1 9120.
G x E 2 78332. 2.134
G x B 2 6530.
P x E x B 2 30150.
G x P x B 4 50285. 1.370
G x P x B 4 53959. 1.470
G x E x B 2 16150.
G x P x E x B 4 34261.
Residual 243 36694.
Total 359
*Significant beyond the .05 level.
Significant beyond the .001 level.
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Experiment 3. The mean latencies were Kxpt. 1, 7.17 sec, Expt. 2,
7.01 sec., Expt. 3, 4.10 sec. As in the previous analyses, the E
effect vas a highly significant source of variance, response latency
after an indicated error being longer than after an indicated correct
button-press (Means: 6.47 sec, and 5.24 sec).
A most interesting effect was shown by the significant P X B
interaction (Fig. 8). It. would appear that over trials the latency
of any reaponse tended to grow longer in the 30 per cent groups,
remain about the same in the 20 per cent groups, and decrease in the
10 per cent groups. Although this effect did not approach signifl
cance in the single experiment analyses, the general trend was in
this direction.
An analysis of variance for total (as opposed to mean) latencies
over all three experiments, to further Investigate G, P, and G x P
effects yielded only Groups as a significant source of variance.
As a final check, two more separate analyses were run on (a) mean
latency following indicated errors only, and (b) mean latency follow-
ing indicated correct responses only. It was reasoned that in this
way, a Proportion effect otherwise hidden by unequal numbers of errors
in the different proportions might appear. Once again, however, only
the Groups effect proved to be significant.
Hypothesis Data. These measurements could be compared only between
the Experiments 1 and 2. Summaries of analyses of variance are pre-
sented in Tables 18, 19, and 20 for major hypothesis changes, hypothesis
amendments, and total alterations of hypotheses, respectively. None
of the analyses revealed a significant source of variance in Proportion.
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Table 18
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Major Hypothesis Changes
by Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 Combined
Source df Mean Square F Ratio
Proportion MP or Error (P) 2 .335
Groups I and II (G) 1 10.890 12.347***
P x G 2 .650
Si/ P x G 54 .882
Trials (T) 14 1.971 20.747***
P x T 28 .068
G x T 14 .147 1.547
P x G x T 28 .064
Ss x 1 (residual] I 756 .095
Total 899
Significant beyond the .001 level.
On the other hand, the Trials effect was significant in all analyses,
the changes and total alterations decreasing, while amendments in-
creased over the eight 10-trial blocks (See Fig. 9). The Groups
effect was significant in the change and alteration analyses, the
noncontingent group making consistently fewer changes and total
alterations, while the groups did not differ in amendment rates.
The G x T interaction was significant in the total alteration analysis,
showing an increasing, then decreasing disparity in total number of
alterations of hypotheses across the series of 80 trials.
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Table 19
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Minor Hypothesis
by Subjects In Experiments 1 and 2 Combined
Source df Mean Square
Proportion MF or Error (P) 2 1.140
Groups I and II (C) 1 .120
P x G 2 .105
Si/ P x G 54 .448
Trials (T) 14 .409
P x T 28 .188
G x T 14 .136
P x G x T 28 .238
Ss x T (residual] I 756 .196
Total 899
F Ratio
2.336
2.087'
1.214
Significant beyond the .01 level.
Table 2u
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Analysis of Variance & y Table for Total Alteration* of
a combined) in Experisjents 1 and 2
Source df Mean Square Ptatio
Proportion MF or Error <P) 2 1.470 2.230
Groups X and IX (G) 1 8.800 13.354***
P x G 2 .765 1.161
|*7 tat 54 .659
Trials CD 14 1.189 6.427***
P it 28 .171
G z T 14 .413 2.232**
P xC xT 28 .191 1.032
Ss x T (residual) 756 .185
Total 899
Significant
Significant
the .01 level,
the .001 level.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSIOM
Probability Matching
The absolute error results Indicated that In both Experl
1 and 3, Ss showed learning during the series of trials. Proportions
of MP and Not X events governed the rate and the final extent of this
learning. Probability matching, however, occurred only In the oc
currence prediction situation, while only something akin to it appeared
in the muIt i-dimensional MP experiment. It is possible that with
more trials, Ss in Experiment 1 might have reached probability match-
ing, and that with still more, they might have adopted a maximising
solution, ss did Bourne's (1963) Ss.
Since the hope of a unique solution was present in both experi
ments, it may be that such an expectancy is a necessary, but not suf-
ficient prerequisite of probability matching behavior. It is clear
from Inspection of the data that the probability matching found in
Experiment 3 was caused by neither a "win-stay, lose-shlft hypo-
thesis, nor by a methodological artifact. On the other hand, It
may be explained by the fact that all Ss made use of sequential rules
bssed upon the series of events prior to each inquiry trial. Indeed,
Ss could have used almost no other kind of rule. Since prior events
almost invariably fell into proportions of roughly 10, 20, and 30
per cent Not X events, it is not surprising that Ss, having adopted a
sequential hypothesis based on the sequence of prior events, would
evidence probability matching behavior. The simplest case, for example,
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is the one in which S responds as if he were repeating the previous
five or ten trials.
It must be recalled, however, that the experimental procedure
required S to state a hypothesis every five trials, forcing him
into the role of a hypothesis tester, which otherwise he might not
To test the assertion that Ss are aware of the overall frequency
of the two events, Ss were asked at the end of the experiment what per
cent of the stimuli had been Type X. In Experiment 3, the cueless
situation, Ss' estimates averaged 72.1, 81.5, and 90.4 per cent,
which were quite close to actuality. In Experiment 1 the mean esti-
mate was 58.75 per cent, somewhat above the true figure of 48.75
per cent Type X. In both experiments, however, Ss needed a considerable
amount of time to make this apparently difficult estimation, demon-
strating that such estimates were not used as general guides, at
least not at a fully conscious (deliberate) level of awareness. Per-
haps the term "probability learning ' is then misleading, and should
be replaced by "learning with probabilistic cues," as has been sug-
gested by Bruner et al. (1956).
Besides probability matching, there was another difference
between the results of Experiments 1 and 3. The Ss in the occurrence-
predicting, cueless situation learned at a significantly faster
rate than did Ss who had to deal with MP and numerous irrelevant
dimensions. It is quite possible that these two differences, learn
-
rate rate, and presence of probability matching, are related. Exactly
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how many dimensions were sailed by Ss in Experiment 1 cannot be esti-
mated with any degree of precision. Nevertheless, there was an average
of 5.3 major hypothesis changes per S. Such a figure, of course, does
not include dimensions sampled and discarded between inquiry points,
or those observed, but not directly tested. It is more than likely
that this multiplicity of irrelevant dimensions caused the decrement
in rate of learning (See for example Pishkin, 1960: Johannaen, 1962),
as well aa the failure to demonstrate probability matching in Experi-
ment 1. The Ss in Experiment 1, seeking a complete solution to the
problem, continued to attend to (or sample) worthless cues, slowing
their learning, while Ss in Experiment 3 had nothing to distract
them from the simplest kind of sequential strategies. Thus one is
led to believe that probability matching is apt to take place in
occurrence predicting, or other simple situations in which rules
cannot reach a high degree of complexity. The data from thla study
suggest that probability matching in occurrence prediction results
from the use of sequential hypotheses.
Behavioral Cheracterletica of Problem Solving
In all three experiments, mean response latency after an indicated
error wea significantly longer than after an Indicated correct response.
These results are in substantial agreement with those of Erickson et al.
(1965), who measured latencies in a standard concept formation task.
However, mean latencies of Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study
were considerably longer (about 3 sec.) than thoae of Erickaon's
experiments, while those of Experiment 3 were approximately the same.
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Also, Srickson found a decreasing latency over trials which occurred
in this study only in the 10 per cent groups for the combined experi-
ments. These discrepancies are probably the result of the present use
of probabilistic feedback and the large number of possible dimensions
as opposed to the standard task with only 4 dimensions used by Erlckson.
On the other hand, it is possible that differences in method and ap-
paratus account for these discrepancies. At any rate, the differences
in mean latencies after indicated errors and Indicated correct responses
tend to support the hypothesis-resampling assumptions of the mathema-
tical models.
One may ask, however, whether hypothesis resampling is the only
possible explanation of longer latencies after errors. It is con-
ceivable that an aversive effect of being told one is "wrong" might
account for the response - latency results. Byers (1965) has done
work suggesting that E's invalidations of S's hypotheses have the
effect of cumulative punishment. If this is the case, longer
latencies after errors might well be expected. Such a viewpoint
would also help to explain the E x B interaction effect in Expert
ment 3 (Pig. 6) , in which mean latency after an indicated error
increased with the number of trials, and the P x B effect in the
combined analysis (Pig. 8), in which mean latencies increased or
decreased over trials m* a function of per cent MP, NC error, and
Not X events. If hypothesis resampling were the only reason for
latency effects, there would be no parsimonious explanation for these
Blocks interaction effects. If, on the other hand, being told one
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Is "wrong" has a cumulative aversive effect, increasing latency with
a mounting number of errors over the 80 trials could be predicted*
The P x E interaction in Experiment 3 (Fig. 5) may indicate
that both effects, resampling and aversive, were operating in the
cueless situation, governing the high 10 and 30 per cent Not-X after
-
error latencies, while the 20 per cent group was not so strongly in-
fluenced by either of them. In other words, it may be speculated
that while latency increases after errors, this Increase is a reeult
of two effects: (a) a positively accelerated increase of aversive
effect from 10 to 30 per cent Not-X and (b) a negatively accelerated
increase of the resampling effect for 10 to 30 per cent Not-X.
Inspecting the rates of total hypothesis alterations in Experiments
1 and 2, it is seen that the G x B interaction expresses similar ratea
at the beginning, followed by a sharper drop of the noncontingent group.
The alteration rates of this group remained below those of Ss in Ex-
periment i until the last few trials, at which time the curvea again
converged (Fig. 9). This effect would be moat simply explained by
calling upon the idea of hypothesis modification as an indirect func-
tion of errors. That is, hypothesis alterations may not be made im-
mediately following an error, but increase with the overall amount of
error feedback. Thus the rapid drop of the noncontingent group Ss
is explained by the fact that they have already reached their maximum
possible performance, while the cue Iff group reached this level later
in the series, when the curves again converged. However, it may be
argued that if hypothesis change ia a function of some level of indicated
error feedback, Proportion should be a significant source of variance
49
In all the hypothesis date analyses. Higher P causes wore errors,
and thus should produce more hypothesis changes and amendment*. Non-
significance of the P effect in these analyses seems to belle the
explanation of hypothesis modification as a result of increasing
errors.
This argument msy possibly be countered with the supposition
that the P effect vea not significant because the difference in the
number of errors between the three proportions was too slight (10 per
cent in the noncontingent group, end less than that in the MP group
until finding the/ optimal solution) . But the difference of average
number of indicated errors between groups at the beginning was about
30 per cent (Exp. 1, SO per cent; Exp. 2, 20 per cent). The average
indicated error difference between groups generally remained larger
than that between proportions until the last few 10-trial blocks.
The Ss in Experiment 1, until they discovered the optimal solution
could do no better than SO per cent correct, and had to continue to
alter their hypotheses if they were to do better than chance. The Ss
in Experiment 2, however, soon found that their hypotheses were yield-
ing what appeared to be a partial solution, and thus could continue to
amend, but seldom completely changed their hypotheses. One thus tends
to suspect that hypothesis alterations occur not necessarily im-
mediately following an error, but only when the level of error is
uncomfortably high. This unique effect cannot generally be observed
in a standard concept formation task, wherein S usually rises from
chance performance to complete solution, without the intervening stage
provided by probabilistic feedback.
It is rather Interesting to note that Ss in the noncontingent
group rapidly adopted fins hypotheses, and changed then less than
did Ss in Experiment 1, who had to deal with a problem in which
there existed a single optimal hypothesis. As mentioned before,
in Experiment 2 any hypothesis was as good as any other, and the
almost immediate "freezing, or adoption of a single hypothesis
(allowing "exceptions to the rule"), fits the definition of super-
stitious behavior; continued use of a hypothesis which actually
works no better than chance, or guessing behavior.
It is evident from the results of all three experiments, and
especially those of Experiment 2, that Ss do retain their hypotheses
although they are making a certain number of errors. Any hypothesis
that leads to better than chance performance is superior to no hypo-
thesis at all, and is not dispensed with because some errors are
occurring. Instead, Ss often attribute errors to some unknown ex
ception to the rule.
Probability learning could not take place without some perseveration
in the face of error. If hypotheses changed with every error, it would
not be possible to learn and maintain a response unless the situation
provided at least one "perfect" answer, which is seldom the case out-
side of the laboratory. Restle (1962) is cognizant of this fact,
and is able to incorporate perseveration into his mathematical learning
medal.
On the other hand, neither Restle's nor Atkinson, Bower, and
Crother's models assume, or account for hypothesis changes when no
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error has occurred. Data from Experiment 2 show that hypothesis change
without immediately preceding error is, in fact* a not uncommon occur-
rence. It would appear then, that although the mathematical model
approach to problem- solving is able to describe final error and trial
data closely, it makes unwarranted assumptions regarding the behaviors
through which these data are produced.
While it has been possible to make some informative comparisons
among these three models of learning, it is noteworthy in itself that
the general behaviors and results do not greatly differ between these
three experimental paradigms. There are, of course, clear differences
in the results, and one model may be more applicable than another for
investigation of certain variables because of its particular charac-
teristics. It appears, though, that each model presents a valid ap
proach to the study of learning with probabilistic cues.
CHAPTER 7
wmma
Previous research In learning with probabilistic cues has eaployed
three primary experimental paradigms: occurrence prediction, misin-
fornative feedback, and noncontingent feedback* Occurrence prediction
experiments require Ss to predict the occurrence of one of two stimuli
over a series of trials, without physical cues to aid their predictions.
Misinformative feedback (MP) is also usually a two-choice situation,
but cues are presented to aid categorizations. These cues, however,
are valid only seme percentage of the time. Noncontingent (NC) feed-
back experiments also have cues, none of which are valid. Reinforce-
ment is predetermined, unsystematic, and occurs on a percentage basis.
A general finding in studies using the first two experimental
situations is that Ss respond positively in a proportion approximating
the percentage of positively reinforced trials. One purpose of the
present research was to investigate possible origins and generality
of this probability matching behavior by examining not only Ss* error
data, but also their verbalised hypotheses.
Mathematical models attempting to describe data acquired in
concept-formation experiments make two basic assumptions: when S
receives an error he will always change his hypothesis, but when he
receives no errors he will never change his hypothesis. A second
major purpose of this study was to examine error records, hypothesis
statements, and response latency times of Ss to test the validity of
these assumptions.
53
The present study consisted of three experiments; one of each of
the three primary paradigms. One hundred male and female introductory
psychology students at Kansas State University served as Ss. Bach
experiment was a repeated measures factorial design, with eight
successive 10- trial blocks, and levels ranging from zero to thirty
per cent Iff, NC error feedback, and Not X events. The stimuli in
Experiments 1 and 2 were three-digit numbers rear-projected on a
screen before S. In Experiment 3 Ss responded after the illumination
of a signal lamp. The Ss indicated their categorizations by pressing
one of two buttons on a control panel. Feedback was presented by
jewel lamps on the same panel. After every five trials Ss stated
their hypotheses regarding the problem's solution.
The error results indicated that probability matching did not
occur in the 19 experiment, but took place in the simple occurrence
predicting situation as a result of Ss adopting sequential categori-
sation rules. Another difference between these two experiments was
that Ss in the occurrence predicting groups learned at a significantly
faster rate. It may be that both differences were due to the large
number of irrelevant dimensions in the MF experiment.
In all three experiments mean response latency was longer after
an error than after a correct response. Reasoning that hypothesis
change (resampling) consumes a certain amount of time, such results
tend to support the assumptions of the mathematical models. On the
other hand, it is probable that an aversive effect of being told one
is "wrong" accounts for at least some of these latency data.
Hypothesis data from the MC experiment make it clear that Ss
do not necessarily change their hypotheses immediately after an
error. Neither do they always maintain a hypothesis in the absence
of an error. Instead, as suggested by the difference in hypothesis
alteration rates of the MP and NC experiments, Ss appear to modify
their hypotheses only when the overall level of error is uncomfortably
high. Although there were many significant differences, the general
trend of behaviors and results was similar in all three of the experi
ital paradigms.
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APPENDIX 1
LIST OF SLIDES PRESENTED IN EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 AND OCCURRENCES
07 THE THREE PROPORTIONS Of NT, NC ERRORS,
AND NOT-X EVENTS IN EXPERIMENTS 1, 2, AND 3
1. 231 41. 462 ft*
2. 554 ** 42. 350
3. 978 43. 595
4. 389 44. 182
5. 973 *** 45. 744 WWW
6. 603 46. 854
7. 463 47. 971
8. 938 48. 882
9. 495 ** 49. 317
10. 367 50. 549 •t
11. 709 51. 183 *
12. 731 *** 52. 105
13. 615 53. 324
14. 313 54. 940
15. 570 ** 55. 997 **
16. 824 56. 483
17. 979 57. 110 ***
18. 967 58. 382
19. 726 * 59. 842
20. 610 60. 379 *
21. 148 61. 246
22. 891 62. 448
23. 259 www 63. 617
24. 814 64. 102 *
25. 165 * 65. 276
26. 548 66. 687 ***
27. 580 67. 408
28. 117 68. 437 *
29. 749 69. 922
30. 697 * 70. 451
31. 693 71. 330
32. 288 72. 223
33. 204 M 73. 628 m
34. 131 74. 504
35. 726 75. 423 ***
36. 523 76. 256
37. 108 *** 77. 435
38. 696 * 78. 362
39. 837 79. 758
40. 865 80. 271
*HP. Noncont ingent error,
i
or Not X event with a proportion of 301
m with proportions of 30% and 201
*** with proportions of 301, 201, and 10%
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APPENDIX 2
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2
This is an experiment in numerical concept formation. Projected
on the screen before you, you will see e series of three-digit numbers,
such as these (Two examples given). Tour task is to decide whether or
not these numbers are of a certain type, which we call "Type X". In
other words, you must learn what attributes the Type X's have in common.
Every time one of these numbers is presented to you, you will indi-
cate by pressing one of the two buttons, whether the number on the screen
is, or is not, Type X. The signal lights on the switch box will then
tell you if your decision was right or wrong so that you will know what
the correct answer waa. Another number will then be presented.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 3
This is an experiment in concept formation. Tou are about to see
a series of events, some of which wc call "Type X,' and others "Type
Not-X. ' Here's how it works: when the red light comes on, that's the
signal that we're ready for the next event. Anytime sfter the red light
appears, you are to press one of the two buttons on the control box
before you to indicate your prediction.
Immediately following your response, one of the two green lights
will come on to tell you what the correct answer was, so that you will
know if your prediction was right. After a few seconds the red light
will come on again, signaling the next event. The red light does not
give any clues about the answer you are to give -it is only a signal.
Initially you will just be guessing, but as the problem goes on, you will
be able to figure out better whether the next event will be a Type X
or a Type Not-X.
BOTH SETS OF INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWED BT THIS STATEMENT
Every so often I will ask you to tell me what your hypothesis is,
that is, your decision rule on strategy for making these choices*
Start with the simplest possible strategies and build from there. Try
to get as many as possible correct. Finding the complete solution to
the problem Is not simple, but many students are able to do it.
Do you have any questions before we begin?
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Previous research in learning with probabilistic cues has employed
three primary experimental paradigm*: occurrence prediction, misin-
fornative feedback, and noncontingent feedback. Occurrence prediction
experiments require Ss to predict the occurrence of one of two stimuli
over s series of trials, without physical cues to aid their predictions.
Misinformative feedback (MP) is slso usually a two-choice situation, but
cues are presented to aid categorizations. These cues, however, are
valid only some per cent of the time. Noncontingent feedback (NC)
experiments also have cues, none of which are valid. Reinforcement
is predetermined, unsystematic, and occurs on a percentage basis.
A general finding in studies using the first two experimental
situations is that Ss respond positively in a proportion approximating
the percentage of positively reinforced trials. One purpose of the
present research was to investigate possible origins and generality
of this probability matching behavior by examining not only Ss'
error data, but also their verbalised hypotheses.
Mathematical models attempting to describe data acquired in
concept -formation experiments make two basic assumptions: when S
receives an error he will alwaya change his hypothesis, but when he
receives no errors he will never change his hypothesis. A second
major purpose of this study was to examine error records, hypothesis
statements, and response letency times of Ss to test the validity of
these assumptions.
The present study consisted of three experiments; one of each
of the three primary paradigms. One hundred male and female intro-
ductory psychology students at Kansas State University served as Ss.
2Each experiment was a repeated measures factorial design, with eight
successive 10- trial blocks, and levels ranging from sero to thirty
per cent MP, HC error feedback, and Not-X events. The stimuli in
Experiments 1 and 2 were three-digit numbers rear-projected on a
screen before S. In Experiment 3, Ss responded after the illumination
of a signal lamp. The Ss indicated their categorizations by pressing
one of two buttons on a control panel. Peedback was presented by
jewel lamps on the same panel. After every five trials Ss stated
their hypotheses regarding the problem's solution. The error results
indicated that probability matching did not occur in the MP experiment,
but took place in the simple occurrence predicting situation as a re-
sult of Ss adopting sequential categorization rules. Another difference
between these two experiments was that Ss in the occurrence predicting
groups learned at a significantly faster rate. It may be that both
differences were due to the large number of irrelevant dimensions
in the MP experiment.
In all three experiments mean response latency was longer after
an error than after a correct response. Reasoning that hypothesis
change (resampling) consumes a certain amount of time, such results
tend to support the assumptions of the mathematical models. On the
other hand, it is probable that an aversive effect of being told one
is "wrong" accounts for at least some of these latency data.
Hypothesis data from the NC experiment make it clear that Ss
do not necessarily change their hypotheses immediately after an error.
Neither do they always maintain a hypothesis in the absence of an error.
Instead, as suggested by the difference in hypothesis alteration rates
3of the MP and NC experiments, Ss appear to modify their hypotheses
only when the overall level of error is uncomfortably high. Although
the overall levels of performance differed, the general trend of be-
haviors and results was similar in all three of the experimental
paradigms.
